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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
disparitybetween the cases leaves in doubt when criminal conduct will
be deened foreseeable. It is clear that past instances of crime are rele-
vant to, but not determinative of, the issue of foreseeability.2' Beyond
that factor, however, the court has not clarified when landlords are
duty-bound to afford their tenants protection from crime.
In conclusion, Vermes raised the significant issues of when a landlord
has a duty to inform a commercial tenant of undesirable conditions of
a premises and when a criminal act against a tenant supersedes a land-
lord's liability for negligence. The court's disposition of these issues
provides some guidance in determining a landlord's duties to inform and
protect. Both issues, however, need further clarification through case
law before the extent of those duties can be fully understood.
Municipal Corporations-SPECIAL ASSESSMENT DETERMINATION-In re
Village of Burnsville, - Minn. -, 245 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
Special assessments levied by municipalities for local improvements
add to the tax burden imposed on Minnesota citizens which now ranks
among the highest in the nation.' The advantage of a general tax is that
necessary public services are provided by government and the burden
is apportioned among all citizens. The purpose of a special assessment,
however, is to fund local services that do not justify payment from
general revenues. Originally, special assessments were held to violate
the state's constitutional requirement of equal taxation.2 However, an
amendment to the Minnesota Constitution in 1869 specifically vali-
dated the use of special assessments for local improvements.3
In the recent case of In re Village of Burnsville,' the Minnesota Su-
preme Court reaffirmed settled interpretations of the 1869 constitu-
tional amendment. In 1963, Burnsville began to assess property at $300
per acre for sewer service. In subsequent years, nearly all the property
in Burnsville was serviced, except for property owned by respondent,
located on the floodplain of the Minnesota River.6 When an interceptor
26. See - Minn. at __, 251 N.W.2d at 106.
1. See MINNESOTA TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATION, How DOES MINNESOTA COMPARE? 2 (1976).
2. Bidwell v. Coleman, 11 Minn. 78, 91 (Gil. 45, 56) (1865); Stinson v. Smith, 8 Minn.
366 (Gil. 326) (1862).
3. MINN. CONST. art. 10, § 1, construed in Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494, 507
(1876).
4. - Minn. -, 245 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
5. See Carlson-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, - Minn . . 240 N.W.2d
517, 519 (1976); Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 95-99, 119 N.W.2d 809, 817-18
(1962); State v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295, 306-10, 23 N.W. 222, 227-29 (1885); Rogers
v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494, 507 (1876).
6. In re Village of Burnsville, - Minn. -, -, 245 N.W.2d 445, 447 (1976). Some
service was provided to adjoining land in 1967. Id. Burnsville contended that trunk service
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sewer7 was constructed across respondent's property, he was assessed
$193,206. Respondent used the land as a landfill and quarry. When
respondent appealed the assessment, the trial court found that the high-
est and best use9 of the property was as a quarry and landfill; thus no
benefit would inure to it."' The assessment was invalidated.
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that Burnsville had
the power to levy the special assessment as long as it could be shown
that the property was specially benefitted by the sewer. Because the
trial court failed to make the required finding of increase in market
value, the case was remanded to determine whether any special benefit
was conferred upon the property."
The Minnesota approach to special assessment justification is not
unique. The amount that each landowner pays has always been based
upon the amount that the landowner benefits from the local improve-
ment, measured by the increase in market value. 2 Payment of an
amount based on increase in market value reimburses the municipality
for the benefits conferred, but payment of more than the increase in
market value constitutes an unconstitutional confiscation of property. 3
The principal assessment question, however, is how to determine
whether the improvement is local, payable from special assessments, or
general, payable from general revenues."
was being provided for the first time, thus respondent could be assessed. Brief for Appel-
lant at 7. See Independent School Dist. No. 709 v. City of Duluth, 287 Minn. 200, 204,
177 N.W.2d 812, 815 (1970) (where land receives benefit and is assessed therefor, there
can be no assessment for later improvement).
7. "Interceptor sewer" means a sewer designed to conduct all or substantially all
sewage from a single governmental unit to treatment works outside the unit. MINN. STAT.
§ 473.121(23) (1976).
8. Respondent was assessed $300 per acre for his 643.97 acres. Expert testimony regard-
ing increase in market value varied from $0 to $290,000. In re Village of Burnsville, __
Minn. , -, 245 N.W.2d 445, 447 (1976).
9. Under the judicial "highest and best use" test, property to be assessed is valued
according to its most advantageous and reasonable use, not speculative use. See D. SALIA,
REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN COURT 74 (1972).
10. But see In re East Fourth Street, 173 Minn. 67, 70, 216 N.W. 607, 608 (1927)
(property devoted to its most valuable use may be benefitted by improvement).
11. The court also held that the Metropolitan Waste Control Commission had the
power to charge Burnsville for building the sewage system, and Burns~ille, in turn, had
the power to require reimbursement by special assessment. In re Village of Burnsville,
__ Minn. - - . 245 N.W.2d 445, 447-48 (1976). See MINN. STAT. §§ 429.051,
444.075(4), 473.521(3) (1976).
12. Nyquist v. Town of Center, - Minn .... 251 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1977); In
re Hazel Park Sewer Sys., 176 Minn. 62, 66, 222 N.W. 522, 523 (1928). See 14 E. McQuIL-
LIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38.02 (3d ed. 1970); C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW
§ 29-2 (1957).
13. In re Superior St., 172 Minn. 554, 559, 216 N.W. 318, 320 (where assessment greatly
exceeds benefits, it is a taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 628 (1927); 14 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 12, § 38.03.
14. In Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494 (1876), the court formulated an approach
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The rule reaffirmed by the court in Burnsville is commonly known as
the special benefits rule, under which an improvement is defined to be
local if it specially benefits property nearby or adjoining the improve-
ment. 5 The test of special benefit is whether the improvement, by rea-
son, of its being confined to a locality, enhances the market value of
adjoining property as distinguished from benefits diffused by it through-
out the municipality.'" Although the rule has been adopted by a major-
ity of jurisdictions, it has been subject to criticism.' 8
The special benefits rule suffers from a conceptual weakness. Under
the rule, the assessor's finding determines not only how much the land-
owner must pay, but also whether or not there has been a local im-
provement. 9 If the assessor can find any increase in market value of the
property in excess of the increase in market values generally, the im-
provement is local and the property may be subject to a special assess-
ment. 0 To counteract the finding of the assessor, expert appraisal testi-
mony is frequently offered by the landowner.' The court then deter-
mines the nature of the improvement, that is, general or local, based
upon the value finding. Because a local increase in market value could
to the question by adopting an assessment test based on benefit to the property measured
by increase in market value. Id. at 508. The market value measure was recently affirmed
in Carlson-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, - Minn. -, -, 240 N.W.2d 517,
519 (1976). The issue of local improvement is a question of fact, State v. District Court,
33 Minn. 295, 308, 23 N.W. 222, 228 (1885), and, because it is initially a legislative, not a
judicial function, it is presumed to be valid. Imperial Refineries, Inc. v. City of Rochester,
282 Minn. 481, 486, 165 N.W.2d 699, 702, appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 4 (1969).
15. Carlson-Lang Realty Co. v. City of Windom, - Minn. -, , 240 N.W.2d
517, 519 (1976); Quality Homes, Inc. v. Village of New Brighton, 289 Minn. 274, 280, 183
N.W.2d 555, 559 (1971); State v. Reis, 38 Minn. 371, 373-74, 38 N.W. 97, 98 (1888); Annot.,
134 A.L.R. 895, 896 (1941).
16. See Mayer v. City of Shakopee, 114 Minn. 80, 82, 130 N.W. 77, 78 (1911); State v.
Reis, 38 Minn. 371, 373, 38 N.W. 97, 98 (1888).
17. Annot., 134 A.L.R. 895, 896 (1941).
18. See City of Waukegan v. De Wolf, 258 Ill. 374, 377-78, 101 N.E. 532, 533 (1913);
Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 270-72, 274 N.W. 605, 607 (1937) (special benefits
definition of local improvement does not add much to the words themselves); Annot., 134
A.L.R. 895, 897 (1941).
19. See In re Village of Burnsville, - Minn .... 245 N.W.2d 445, 450 (1976)
(if improvement caused market values to rise $100 per acre, but caused value of subject
property to rise $1,000, special benefit would be $900).
20. Minnesota assessors are presumed to consider only the local effect of an improve-
ment, and to overlook general benefit. Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 92, 119
N.W.2d 809, 815 (1962). See Qvale v. City of Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 59, 25 N.W.2d 699,
704 (1946) (where reasonable persons differ, the assessor's determination will be upheld).
21. See In re Village of New Brighton, 293 Minn. 356, 357-58, 199 N.W.2d 435, 436-37
(1972). An implicit purpose for the expert testimony is government bias of the assessor.
Cf. Handler, The Real Estate Valuation Witness-Competency and Weight, 8 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE 67, 80-81 (1964) (eminent domain appraisers are often challenged for bias towards
government resulting from long experience and fear of losing job).
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probably be found for almost any improvement," such judicial juggling
with market values as the sole determinant for assessment justification
seems unsatisfactory.2
Alternatives to the special benefits rule exist. The court either could
adopt a more restrictive definition of the concept of local improvement,
or it could continue to apply the special benefits rule but qualify its
application. A more restrictive definition of local improvement forms
the basis for the "primary purpose" rule. 2' Formulated by the Illinois
court in City of Chicago v. Law, 2 the definition is now accepted in one
form or another by seven states.6 Under the primary purpose rule, if the
primary purpose and effect of an improvement is to improve a locality,
it is a local improvement. If the primary purpose and effect is to benefit
the public generally, then it is a general improvement, notwithstanding
incidental benefit to localities.2 7 The primary purpose rule consists of a
two-stage analysis. First, the improvement itself is analyzed to deter-
mine whether its primary purpose and effect is to benefit the locality or
the general public.2 If the primary purpose and effect of the improve-
ment has been determined to be local, only then is the special benefit
assessment made. For example, if a city decides to install a sewer sys-
tem, all connections to the interceptor sewer would primarily benefit the
individual local residents. However, if the city built a new treatment
plant and installed interceptor sewers for the entire city, the primary
purpose and effect of the improvement would inure to the public in
general.
29
22. See City of Waukegan v. De Wolf, 258 IIl. 374, 378-79, 101 N.E. 532, 533 (1913);
Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 271-72, 274 N.W. 605, 607 (1937).
23. See State v. District Court, 33 Minn. 295, 304, 23 N.W. 222, 226 (1885) ("Amid the
conflict of opinions it is easy to see that there may have been errors of judgment on the
part of the assessors.").
24. City of Waukegan v. De Wolf, 258 Ill. 374, 378-83, 101 N.E. 532, 533-35 (1913);
Annot., 134 A.L.R. 895, 897 (1941).
25. 144 Ill. 569, 33 N.E. 855 (1893).
26. See Home Builders Ass'n v. Riddle, 109 Ariz. 404, 407, 510 P.2d 376, 379 (1973);
Crane v. City of Siloam. Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 37, 55 S.W. 955, 957 (1899); Rafkin v. City
of Miami Beach, 38 So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1949); City of Waukegan v. De Wolf, 258 Ill.
374, 378, 101 N.E. 532, 533 (1913); Hinman v. Temple, 133 Neb. 268, 271, 274 N.W. 605,
607 (1937); Ruel v. Rapid City, 84 S.D. 79, 86, 167 N.W.2d 541, 544-45 (1969); Duncan
Dev. Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 125 N.W.2d 617, 620 (1964).
27. See Village of Downers Grove v. Bailey, 325 Ill. 186, 191, 156 N.E. 362, 363 (1927);
City of Waukegan v. De Wolf, 258 Ill. 374, 378, 101 N.E. 532, 533 (1913); In re Village of
Hinsdale, 23 111. App. 3d 357, 359-61, 319 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1974).
28. The determination of the nature of the improvement would probably be made in
the first instance by the city council with advice from the city attorney as counsel. Cf.
Fowler v. City of Santa Fe, 72 N.M. 60, 380 P.2d 511 (1963) (city council acted on advice
of city engineer).
29. See Village of Grand Ridge v. Hayes, 271 Ill. 431, 111 N.E. 289 (1915). Even if the
improvement is determined to be of general benefit, members of the locality incidentally
benefitted would nevertheless pay increased general property taxes because of the inciden-
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The primary purpose rule seems to describe more accurately the con-
cept of local improvement, 0 and it reflects early judicial intent to sanc-
tion special assessments only in equitable cases." The basic advantage
of the primary purpose rule is that it narrows the definition of local
improvement by focusing the judicial inquiry at the first instance on the
nature of the improvement, not market values.2
As an alternative to the primary purpose rule, the court could also
consider adopting reasonable qualifications to the application of the
special benefits rule. Some jurisdictions recognize an improvement-type
distinction, under which the nature of the improvement is a function of
prior determination. The general or special nature of an improvement
is established by statute or by the courts. For example, main sewers can
be distinguished from district sewers.3 Costs for main sewer construc-
tion are considered general expenses, but district sewer construction is
considered a local expense. A similar distinction may be made with
tal benefit. Thus, the benefit would not go untaxed. See generally MINN. STAT. § 272.01
(1976).
30. But see 21 ILL. L. REv. 54, 54-56 (1926) (primary purpose rule inferior to special
benefits rule; an "inspiration of but a few cases").
31. See Sperry v. Flygare, 80 Minn. 325, 328, 83 N.W. 177, 178 (1900) (dictum) (special
assessments justified only when improvement so beneficial to private interests as to make
it unjust for public to pay).
32. Primary purpose rule cases refusing special assessments include: Home Builders
Ass'n v. Riddle, 109 Ariz. 404, 510 P.2d 376 (1973) (city parks); Rafkin v. City of Miami
Beach, 38 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1949) (road widening project), noted in 3 MIAMI L.Q. 641 (1949);
Stockman v. City of Trenton, 132 Fla. 406, 181 So. 383 (1938) (same); Village of Grand
Ridge v. Hayes, 271 111. 431, 111 N.E. 289 (1915) (water main); Hinman v. Temple, 133
Neb. 268, 274 N.W. 605 (1937) (viaduct); Ruel v. Rapid City, 84 S.D. 79, 167 N.W.2d 541
(1969) (public auditorium). Primary purpose rule cases finding a local improvement in-
clude: Nakdimen v. Fort Smith & Van Buren Bridge Dist., 115 Ark. 194, 172 S.W. 272
(1914) (bridge); City of Belleville v. Miller, 339 Ill. 360, 171 N.E. 535 (1930) (sewer sys-
tem); Village of Downers Grove v. Bailey, 325 Il. 186, 156 N.E. 362 (1927) (water main);
Duncan Dev. Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964)
(water tower).
33. See Southworth v. City of Glascow, 232 Mo. 108, 132 S.W. 1168 (1910); State v.
Wilder, 217 Mo. 261, 116 S.W. 1087 (1909); Hill v. Swingley, 159 Mo. 45, 60 S.W. 114
(1900) (decisions interpreting ordinance which distinguished main sewers from district
sewers; main sewers provide general benefit). Montana, under a statute, has followed the
Missouri approach. See Crutchfield v. Nash, 84 Mont. 556, 276 P. 938 (1929); Rush v.
Grandy, 66 Mont. 222, 213 P. 242 (1923). Minnesota followed this approach in the past.
See Act of April 21, 1903, ch. 312, § 2, 1903 Minn. Laws 545 (repealed 1953) (sewers
classified general are financed by general revenues, sewers classified district are financed
by special assessments). Other jurisdictions achieve this distinction by judicial declara-
tion. See City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 376111. 327,331, 33 N.E.2d 598, 601 (1941); Hurd
v. Sanitary Sewer Dist. No. 1, 109 Neb. 384, 388, 191 N.W. 438, 439 (1922) (interceptor
sewers are general improvements). But see Duncan Dev. Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary
Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 265, 125 N.W.2d 617, 620 (1964) (difficult to classify improvements
abstractly as local or general for purpose of considering special assessments); MINN. STAT.
§ 429.051 (1976) (municipalities have discretion to decide the nature of the improvement).
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regard to water supply."4 In addition, original construction and repair
improvement can be distinguished.35 Such preconceived qualifications
can result in a careful and just approach to municipal revenue policy.
Other courts qualify the special benefits rule by invalidating assess-
ment when the benefit from the improvement is based on mere specula-
tion or conjecture." To assess equitably under this qualification, benefit
to the property must be actual, physical, and material.37 Assessments
held void for speculative benefits typically include projects providing no
objective benefit to adjoining property owners,3 or projects requiring
future action for completion. There is authority in Minnesota law sup-
porting the speculative benefit qualification to the special benefits
rule.40
The court's sanction of Burnsville's assessment under the special ben-
34. See Village of Grand Ridge v. Hayes, 271 I1. 431, 111 N.E. 289 (1915).
35. Crane v. West Chicago Park Comm'rs, 153 Ill. 348, 353, 38 N.E. 943, 944 (1894)
(repair improves public access, general benefit because special benefit has already been
received); City of Erie v. Russell, 148 Pa. 384, 386-87, 23 A. 1102, 1103 (1892) (sewers);
Hammett v. City of Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146, 156 (1869) (streets). See St. Paul, Minn.,
Council File No. 268302 (Dec. 21, 1976) (reconstruction of standard improvements such
as streets, curbs, and gutters should be financed by general revenues). See generally
Plowman, Municipal Assessments for Reconstruction of Streets, Sewers, Sidewalks and
Water Mains, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 87 (1957).
36. E.g., Kansas City S. Ry. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 3, 266 U.S. 379, 387 (1924).
This approach may depart from the general rule that the benefit from the improvement
inures to the land itself regardless of its present use. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 433 (1905) (the amount of benefit is a matter of
forecast and estimate); Qvale v. City of Willmar, 223 Minn. 51, 57, 25 N.W.2d 699, 703
(1946).
37. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Petrie, 37 Idaho 45, 54, 223 P. 531,533 (1923);
City of Lawton v. Akers, 333 P.2d 520, 524-25 (Okla. 1958) (benefits from improvements
which depend upon contingencies and future action of public authorities cannot be consid-
ered in making the assessment); Wm. H. Heinemann Creameries, Inc. v. Village of Ke-
waskum, 275 Wis. 636, 641, 82 N.W.2d 902, 905 (1957).
38. See DeFraties v. Kansas City, 521 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Mo. 1975) (four-lane highway
found detrimental because of increased traffic, noise, pollution, and litter; special assess-
ment held void); Heavens v. King County Rural Library Dist., 66 Wash. 2d 558, 563-66,
404 P.2d 453, 456-58 (1965) (benefit from library held incidental and remote; benefit must
be actual, physical, and material). But see Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 98,
119 N.W.2d 809, 817 (1962) (assessment for street improvement upheld; land should be
considered generally and apart from particular use at time of assessment); Heavens v.
King County Rural Library Dist., 66 Wash. 2d 558, 567-68, 404 P.2d 453, 458-59 (1965)
(dissenting opinion) (library specially benefits adjoining landowners).
39. City of Carterville v. Phillips, 309 Ill. 433, 141 N.E. 182 (1923); City of Chicago v.
Sullivan Mach. Co., 269 Ill. 58,62, 109 N.E. 696, 698 (1915); Crutchfield v. Nash, 84 Mont.
556, 568-69, 276 P. 938, 943 (1929); Molbreak v. Village of Shorewood Hills, 66 Wis. 2d
687, 225 N.W.2d 894 (1975) (assessment based on possibility of future rezoning).
40. See In re Faribault County, 237 Minn. 358, 362, 55 N.W.2d 308, 311 (1952) (assess-
ment cannot be based upon speculative, future benefits); Mayer v. City of Shakopee, 114
Minn. 80, 83, 130 N.W. 77, 78 (1911) ("when an arbitrary rule is followed, without regard
to proximity, location, or conditions, the assessment is void").
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efits rule in this case seems unfair." The purpose of the interceptor sewer
across respondent's property was to carry effluent from Burnsville to a
new sewage treatment plant. 2 Rather than justifying assessment solely
upon speculative market value considerations, the primary purpose rule
would first determine the purpose and effect of the improvement to
determine whether the sewer was constructed for the benefit of the
municipality, or for the local landowners, Moreover, the improvement-
type distinction qualification to the special benefits rule would equita-
bly apportion cost based on common experience regarding the effect of
certain improvements. Finally, because the foreseeable and restricted
use of respondent's property 3 was as a landfill and quarry, a determina-
tion of increased market value may have been based on mere specula-
tion and conjecture as to future use. The result in Burnsville suggests
that Minnesota's special assessments policy should be reviewed.
Workers' Compensation- CALCULATION OF EARNINGS CAPACITY-
Mathison v. Thermal Co., - Minn. -, 243 N.W.2d 110 (1976).
Workers' compensation laws were developed to provide a system of
compensation to workers injured while at work.' Minnesota has adopted
this system, which imposes financial liability upon the employer with-
out regard to fault.2 Under Minnesota law, compensation is based upon
41. See City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 376 Ill. 327, 331, 33 N.E.2d 598, 601 (1941) (it
is impossible to justify special assessment to finance interceptor sewers). But see Federal
Constr. Co. v. Ensign, 59 Cal. App. 200, 215-19, 210 P. 536, 542-43 (1922) (city built new
sewage disposal plant and interceptor sewer and all city property assessed; entire city may
specially benefit from local improvement).
42. In re Village of Burnsville,__ Minn .... 245 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1976).
43. See Brief for Respondent at 21 (with regard to nearly all of respondent's property,
any use of land other than present use requires approval of Lower Minnesota River Wat-
ershed District, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, State Pollution Control
Agency, City of Burnsville, and Metropolitan Council).
1. The Interim Commission on Industrial Accident Compensation and State Industrial
Insurance, Report to the Legislature of Minnesota, MINN. S. JOUR. 131 (1921) stated:
The underlying theory of the new system of compensation is that it is for the
welfare of society as a whole that all employe receive certain designated benefits
payable in installments, as wages are payable, rather than that a few only of
the injured should receive larger amounts in a lump sum; a considerable part
of which was often consumed by attorney's fees and expenses of litigation and
the balance often lost through unwise business ventures or extravagent living.
2. MINN. STAT. § 176.021(2) (1976) (emphasis added) provides in part:
Every such employer is liable for compensation according to the provisions of
this chapter and is liable to pay compensation in every case of personal injury
or death of his employee arising out of and in the course of employment without
regard to the question of negligence, unless the injury was intentionally self-
inflicted or when the intoxication of the employee is the proximate cause of the
injury.
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